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• 1
The Doctrine of Severability in 
Constitutional Review: A Perspective 
from Singapore
Benjamin Joshua Ong* 
A B S T R A C T
The Singapore Court of Appeal’s decision in Prabagaran a/l Srivijayan v. Public 
Prosecutor represents a substantial development in Singapore’s law on the doctrine 
of severability in constitutional review. An examination of Prabagaran reveals rich 
theoretical underpinnings relating to the nature of legislative intent. The case rightly 
locates the crux of the severability inquiry in secondary legislative intention: in other 
words, the legislature’s intention, at the time a statute was enacted, as to what should 
happen in the event that part of the statute is later held to be unconstitutional. This 
approach is preferable to the approach of asking whether excision of unconstitutional 
parts of the legislation would leave behind something that is ‘substantially a differ-
ent law’, an approach that can lead to the judicial frustration of legislative policy. The 
search for secondary legislative intent is not just a matter of speculation; Prabagaran 
demonstrates how it may be inferred from evidence such as the structure of legisla-
tion, legislative history, and speeches in Parliament. In addition, Prabagaran highlights 
the importance of applicants’ identifying precisely the object of a constitutional chal-
lenge and the exact reliefs sought.
1 .  I N T R O D U C T I O N
Article 4 of Singapore’s Constitution1 provides:
This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic of Singapore and any 
law enacted by the Legislature2 after the commencement of this Constitution 
* Lecturer of Law (FDS), Singapore Management University School of Law, 55 Armenian Street, Singapore 179943, Republic of 
Singapore. Email: benjaminjong@smu.edu.sg. I am grateful to the Registry of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Singapore for 
granting my application to inspect the case file relating to the Prabagaran case (n 4) for the purpose of verifying the understanding 
of the parties’ submissions which I had gained from reading the Court of Appeal’s judgment; however, nothing in the case file has 
influenced the contents of this paper as I am satisfied that the judgment accurately captures the parties’ written submissions.
1 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Rev Ed).
2 The Legislature of Singapore consists of a unicameral Westminster-style Parliament and the President; as Art. 58(1) of the 
Constitution provides, ‘the power of the Legislature to make laws [is] exercised by Bills passed by Parliament and assented 
to by the President’. In this paper, ‘legislature’ and ‘Parliament’ will be used interchangeably.
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which is inconsistent with this Constitution shall, to the extent of the incon-
sistency, be void.
The Constitution does not make clear what the words ‘to the extent of the inconsist-
ency’ mean. A 2012 case provided the gloss that
Article 4 provides for the unconstitutional portion of the law to be severed 
while retaining the remaining part of the law in the statute books.3
but this does not say much: it does not explain how such severance is to be effected or 
how to tell whether severance is possible at all. For example, it might be the case that 
effective severance would require the exercise of power which the courts do not pos-
sess. Alternatively, severance might simply not be possible because what is left behind 
is too incoherent to count as a law. Or it might be that, because severance is possible, a 
finding of unconstitutionality might not help a person who seeks to have only part of a 
law struck down for unconstitutionality with the motive of escaping the other, consti-
tutionally valid, part of the law.
It was not until a few years later that the law on severance was substantially devel-
oped following a series of constitutional challenges against legislation relating to the 
sentencing of drug traffickers. The most recent of these is Prabagaran a/l Srivijayan 
v.  Public Prosecutor (‘Prabagaran’).4 This note aims to expose and explore the rich 
theoretical foundations underlying the decision in Prabagaran, with a view to com-
menting on how litigants and courts ought to approach constitutional challenges 
to parts of legislation. Our hope is that Prabagaran will serve as a fertile source of 
theoretical ideas, particularly relating to the idea of legislative intention, as well as an 
illustration of how those ideas may be put into action both in Singapore and in other 
jurisdictions.
2 .  T H E  L E G I S L AT I O N  O N  S E N T E N C I N G  D R U G  T R A F F I C K E R S
Prior to 2012, under the Misuse of Drugs Act5 (the ‘Act’), a person who trafficked in or 
imported or exported drugs6 faced the mandatory death penalty under section 33 read 
with the Second Schedule of the Act. Section 33 provides:
the Second Schedule shall have effect…with respect to the way in which 
offences under this Act are punishable on conviction.
The Second Schedule, in turn, contains a table listing various offences and the ranges 
of punishments therefor—an extract will illustrate this:
3 Tan Eng Hong v. Attorney-General [2012] SGCA 45, [2012] 4 SLR 476 [59].
4 Prabagaran a/l Srivijayan v. Public Prosecutor [2017] SGCA 67, [2017] 1 SLR 173.
5 Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed).
6 Sections 5(1) and 7 of the Act (n 5). The difference between the two offences is not material for present purposes.
Page 2 of 20 • Severability in Constitutional Review
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/slr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/slr/hmx030/4822988
by Singapore Management University user
on 24 January 2018
Extract from the Second Schedule to the Act
It is not surprising that several offenders who had been sentenced to death sought 
to challenge the constitutionality of this sentencing regime. However, these challenges 
failed.9
In 2012, section 33B was added to the Act, providing courts with the discretion 
to sentence such a person to life imprisonment and caning instead of death in cer-
tain circumstances. For present purposes, we are concerned with the following set of 
circumstances10:
Extracts from section 33B of the Act
(1) Where a person commits or attempts to commit an offence [of trafficking 
or importing or exporting drugs], being an offence punishable with death under 
[…] of the Second Schedule, and he is convicted thereof, the court—
(a)  may, if the person satisfies the requirements of subsection (2), instead of 
imposing the death penalty, sentence the person to imprisonment for life 
and, if the person is sentenced to life imprisonment, he shall also be sen-
tenced to caning of not less than 15 strokes; […]
(2) The requirements referred to in subsection (1)(a) are as follows:
(a) the person convicted proves, on a balance of probabilities, that his involve-
ment in the offence […] was restricted—
(i) to transporting, sending or delivering a controlled drug;
(ii) to offering to transport, send or deliver a controlled drug;
7 That is, strokes of the cane.
8 This refers to a mandatory penalty rather than a maximum penalty: Nguyen Tuong Van v. Public Prosecutor [2004] SGCA 47, 
[2005] 1 SLR(R) 103 [53].
9 Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor [1979–1980] SLR(R) 710, [1981] 1 AC 648 (PC); Nguyen (n 8); Yong Vui Kong v. Public 
Prosecutor [2010] SGCA 20, [2010] 3 SLR 489. A number of applications for judicial review of related decisions also failed: 
Thiruselvam s/o Nagaratnam v.  Public Prosecutor [2001] SGCA 13, [2001] 1 SLR(R) 362 and Ramalingam Ravinthran 
v. Attorney-General [2012] SGCA 2, [2012] 2 SLR 49 (decisions to prosecute); and Yong Vui Kong v. Attorney-General [2011] 
SGCA 9, [2011] 2 SLR 1189 (decision by the President not to grant clemency to an offender).
10 The parts of this provision not reproduced here pertain to another discretionary sentencing regime for offenders who were 
‘suffering from such abnormality of mind…as substantially impaired [their] mental responsibility’ for their offences.
Section General nature of offence Punishment
5 (4) Unauthorised traffic in 
controlled drug containing 
such quantity of diamorphine 
being—
(a) not less than 10 grammes 
and not more than 15 grammes
Maximum 30 years or impris-
onment for life and 15 strokes7
Minimum 20  years and 15 
strokes
(b) more than 15 grammes Death8
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(iii) to doing or offering to do any act preparatory to or for the purpose 
of his transporting, sending or delivering a controlled drug; or
(iv)  to any combination of activities in sub-paragraphs (i), (ii) and 
(iii); and
(b)the Public Prosecutor certifies to any court that, in his determination, the 
person has substantively assisted the Central Narcotics Bureau in disrupting drug 
trafficking activities within or outside Singapore. […]
(4)  The determination of whether or not any person has substantively assisted 
the Central Narcotics Bureau in disrupting drug trafficking activities shall be 
at the sole discretion of the Public Prosecutor and no action or proceeding 
shall lie against the Public Prosecutor in relation to any such determination 
unless it is proved to the court that the determination was done in bad faith 
or with malice.
3 .  E A R LY  FA L S E  S TA R T S :  T H E  I M P O R TA N C E  O F  I D E N T I F Y I N G 
T H E  O B J E C T  O F  C H A L L E N G E
The new legislation spawned further litigation. Some of it consisted of challenges to the 
Public Prosecutor’s exercise of his discretion so as not to certify under section 33B(2)(b) 
that an offender had substantively assisted the Central Narcotics Bureau (hereafter, to issue 
a ‘Certificate’); these challenges failed.11
Other challenges were brought against the legislation itself rather than against admin-
istrative action taken pursuant to the legislation. These merit closer study because, 
rather than being challenges to one rule, they were challenges to a complex statutory 
scheme. The latest of these challenges (resulting in the most comprehensive judicial 
treatment of the topic of severance) is Prabagaran, which was decided by Singapore’s 
Court of Appeal. Before studying that case, however, it is worth briefly outlining the 
two cases leading up to it (which were decided by the same court).
(A) Quek Hock Lye v. Public Prosecutor
The first such case was Quek Hock Lye v. Public Prosecutor (‘Quek’).12 The applicant had 
been sentenced to the then-mandatory death penalty (and had his appeal against con-
viction dismissed) prior to the enactment of section 33B. After the enactment of sec-
tion 33B, he had sought to have his sentence re-considered pursuant to section 27(1) of 
the Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Act 201213 (the ‘Transitional Provision’):
27 .(1)  Where, on the appointed day, the Court of Appeal has dismissed an 
appeal brought by a person for a relevant offence, the following provi-
sions shall apply:
(a)  the person may apply to the High Court to be re-sentenced in 
accordance with section 33B of the principal Act […]
11 Muhammad Ridzuan bin Mohd Ali v. Attorney-General [2015] SGCA 53, [2015] 5 SLR 1222.
12 Quek Hock Lye v. Public Prosecutor [2015] SGCA 7, [2015] 2 SLR 563.
13 Act 30 of 2012.
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However, the Public Prosecutor had refused to issue a Certificate to him, rendering 
him ineligible to be sentenced under section 33B to imprisonment and caning instead 
of death. He sought to argue that the Transitional Provision violated the constitutional 
guarantee of equality before the law because, of all those who had previously been con-
victed of capital offences, some (that is, those who met the criteria in section 33B(2)) 
could now be spared the death penalty, whereas others (like him) could not.14
The court dismissed this argument. It added that, if it were to succeed, the effect would 
be that the Transitional Provision would be struck down, leaving the applicant with no 
way to have his sentence of death changed.15 In other words, the application, ‘even if suc-
cessful, could not benefit the Applicant’.16
Notably, the applicant did not claim that, for instance, part of the Transitional 
Provision was unconstitutional or that its effects when read in conjunction with section 
33B were unconstitutional—perhaps such arguments could have addressed the court’s 
concerns. Nor does he appear to have made submissions on what the effects of a finding 
of unconstitutionality would be. His only retort was that, should the application suc-
ceed, ‘Parliament [would have] a chance to reconsider the law’17—it is not clear what 
this means or how it would have helped him.
(B) Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor
This weakness in the way in which the applicant in Quek put his case echoes that in 
another case, Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor (‘Yong’).18 The applicant, who had been 
sentenced under section 33B(1)(a) to life imprisonment and caning, argued, inter alia, 
that his caning sentence was in violation of the constitutional right to equality in that, 
according to section 325(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (‘CPC’)19 (the ‘Caning 
Restriction Provision’), women and men aged above 50 could not be caned:
325. (1) The following persons shall not be punished with caning:
(a) women;
(b)  men who are more than 50 years of age at the time of infliction of the can-
ing […]
The trouble was that the applicant had framed his challenge as a challenge to the 
Caning Restriction Provision only. The court pointed out that, even if this challenge 
were to succeed, the result would not be that the ‘caning regime as a whole [w]ould be 
struck down’. Again, because ‘the violation of [the constitutional guarantee of equal-
ity], if any, stems from the enactment of [the Caning Restriction Provision]’, a suc-
cessful constitutional challenge would merely lead to the striking down of the Caning 
Restriction Provision; the applicant’s caning sentence would remain.20
14 Quek (n 12) [17].
15 Quek (n 12) [26].
16 Quek (n 12) [26].
17 Quek (n 12) [26].
18 Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor [2015] SGCA 11, [2015] 2 SLR 1129.
19 Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed.
20 Yong (n 18) [104].
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(C) Analysis
In Quek and Yong, valuable opportunities to develop the law had been lost. Up to this 
point, it had always been assumed that Article 4 of the Constitution contemplates a 
constitutional challenge to one provision of a statute: no more, no less. This assumption 
could have been challenged: it could, for example, have been argued that the object of 
challenge could be a group of statutory provisions that form part of the same statutory 
scheme, or part of a statutory provision. To elaborate:
 a. In Quek, it appears that the applicant took issue with the Transitional 
Provision ‘read with s 33B of the [Act]’,21 yet sought to challenge the con-
stitutionality of the Transitional Provision only. The applicant did not seek 
to mount a broader challenge the entire sentencing regime as a whole, for 
example by seeking to argue that the rest of the sentencing regime was 
inseverable from the allegedly unconstitutional part, or by seeking to 
argue that the Transitional Provision and/or its effects were too narrow in 
scope.
 b. In Yong, the applicant did not seek to mount a narrower challenge by 
claiming that, though the law on caning was not unconstitutional in toto, it 
may be severed according to the fact patterns to which it would apply and 
held unconstitutional as applied to some of those cases. For example, the 
applicant might have argued that, without prejudice to the existence of 
the Caning Restriction Provision (which exempts women and older men 
from being caned), statutes providing for caning of offenders would be 
unconstitutional to the extent that they apply to younger men.22
In short: the applicants sought to challenge parts of statutory schemes, but had 
challenged the wrong parts by framing their challenges too broadly or narrowly. This 
would most likely not have made a difference to the ultimate outcome since the courts 
ultimately dismissed the constitutional challenges. Nonetheless, what these cases make 
clear is that it is important to identify correctly the statute, or part thereof, which is 
under challenge. This is particularly so when the ground of challenge is inequality23 
because the right to equal treatment says nothing about what that treatment is—for 
instance, men and women would be treated equally, not only if neither were liable to 
caning, but also if both were. In such a case, the applicant cannot simply state that the 
statute is void because it leads to inequality; the applicant must state exactly what effect 
of the statute gives rise to the inequality, and hence what the remedy ought to be.
The key development is that the courts implicitly agreed that it would in prin-
ciple be possible to strike down the Transitional Provision (in Quek) and the Caning 
Restriction Provision (in Yong). These were provisions dictating how other statutory 
provisions were to be applied; in other words, each case represented a challenge to a 
provision that was but one part of a statutory regime. While the courts questioned 
21 Quek (n 12) [26].
22 There is authority supporting the view that the court may make a declaration to this effect: Dunkley v. Evans [1981] 1 WLR 
1522 (DC) 1525G.
23 Art 12 of the Constitution.
Page 6 of 20 • Severability in Constitutional Review
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/slr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/slr/hmx030/4822988
by Singapore Management University user
on 24 January 2018
the practical logic of the applicants’ seeking to sever these statutory regimes into parts 
and challenge some of those parts, the courts did not deny that such severance was in 
principle possible.
4 .  T H E  P R A B AG A R A N   C A S E
As we have seen from Quek and Yong, having properly identified the object of challenge, 
the applicant must make clear what he wants the court to do to it and must ensure that 
the remedy will be of practical benefit to him. In Prabagaran, the applicants’ submis-
sions on this issue were much more sophisticated.
Prabagaran involved four people who had been sentenced to death for drug traf-
ficking and who had failed to avail themselves of section 33B of the Act. They sought 
to argue that, because part of the scheme was unconstitutional, they ought to be sen-
tenced to life imprisonment and caning instead.
The court’s concern was that, if they were challenging section 33B of the Act, such a 
challenge would not result in changes to their death sentences:
if the applicants are correct in their contentions that s 33B is unconstitutional, 
then this court would have to disregard s 33B as if it was never enacted and each 
of the applicants would have to be sentenced under the Second Schedule. We 
could not see how this argument could assist them.24
Therefore, the applicants stressed that their position was not that all the court could 
do was to strike down section 33B in toto. Instead, they thus pleaded several alternative 
cases, evidently seeking to cover all bases25:
 i. Sections 33B(2)(b) and 33B(4) were unconstitutional and should be struck 
down, leaving the rest of section 33B intact26;
 ii. Sections 33B(2)(b) and 33B(4) were unconstitutional and should be struck 
down, together with the Second Schedule, since all of these work in ‘inextric-
able tandem’27;
 iii. The entire sentencing regime under the Act was unconstitutional and should 
be struck down; and
 iv. Section 33B should be ‘cured’ by deleting section 33B(4) and the words ‘the 
Public Prosecutor certifies to any court that, in his determination’ in section 
33B(2)(b).28
The court held that the constitutional challenges failed. The Court also remarked, 
however, that that, even if they had succeeded, they would not have assisted the appli-
cants because none of the reliefs sought would be available. The only relief available, 
even if the alleged unconstitutionality had been made out, would have been to strike 
down section 33B as a whole—no more and no less.
24 Prabagaran (n 4) [15].
25 Prabagaran (n 4) [21].
26 Prabagaran (n 4) [33].
27 Prabagaran (n 4) [27].
28 Prabagaran (n 4) [40].
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5 .  T H E  T E S T  F O R  S E V E R A B I L I T Y:  T H E  S E A R C H  F O R  L E G I S L AT I V E 
I N T E N T I O N
(A) Two Types of Legislative Intention: Primary and Secondary
In reaching this conclusion, the court began by identifying the test for severability. 
Applying the remarks of the US Supreme Court in Alaska Airlines Inc v.  Brock,29 the 
court held that a legislative provision is:
 a. Severable if ‘the truncated statute, with the unconstitutional portion 
excised, will operate in the manner that the legislature intended’30;
 b. Severable if the legislature ‘would have enacted the truncated statute with 
only the remaining provisions’31;
 c. But, conversely, not severable if the truncated statute ‘cannot function 
without [the unconstitutional part], at least in a manner that Parliament 
could not have contemplated’.32
Therefore, declared the court,
in the exercise of severance, legislative intent is paramount. The reason for this is 
clear: to allow the courts to do so in a manner that is contrary to the intent under-
lying the passage of the provision in question would effectively confer upon the 
judiciary legislative powers and violate the principle of separation of powers. 
[…] it must be shown to be Parliament’s intention behind the enactment of an 
Act that is found to be partially in breach of the Constitution that it should never-
theless continue to be given effect even after the severance and invalidity of some 
portions.33
As we will see, this passage is crucial to understanding the court’s approach. It places 
the focus squarely on the legislature’s intention as to whether what remains after sev-
erance should survive as law. Let us call this intention the ‘secondary intention’ of the 
legislature. It is distinct from what we will call the ‘primary intention’, which is simply 
the intention that the statute take effect exactly as it was enacted.
The problem lies in how to ascertain the secondary legislative intention. We will now 
explain why, difficult as this exercise is, it is the right one to undertake. We will then 
explore how the court in Prabagaran went about performing this task.
(B) Is the Search for Secondary Intention Misplaced?
(i) Criticisms of the Search for Secondary Intent 
The approach of searching for the legislature’s secondary intention has been criticized 
as being purely hypothetical. For example, the High Court of Australia remarked in 
an early case: ‘What a man would have done in a state of facts which never existed is a 
matter of mere speculation, which a man cannot certainly answer for himself, much less 
29 480 US 678 (1987).
30 Prabagaran (n 4) [35].
31 Prabagaran (n 4) [35].
32 Prabagaran (n 4) [30].
33 Prabagaran (n 4) [36]–[37].
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for another’.34 In a similar vein, the High Court of Singapore had previously remarked 
that a similar act of severance in the context of contract law would not be in line with 
the drafters’ intentions; it was said to ‘amoun[t] to a unilateral variation of the parties’ 
obligations imposed by the court with the benefit of hindsight’.35
Such criticisms typically favour a test for severability that purports to focus on the 
text of the legislation rather than the secondary intention of the legislature, presum-
ably because the former is more certainly ascertainable. Formulations of such a test 
include:
 a. ‘whether the statute with the invalid portions omitted would be substan-
tially a different law as to the subject matter dealt with by what remains 
from what it would be with the omitted portions forming part of it’36; and
 b. whether the court, were it to effect severance, would be ‘effecting no 
change in the substantial purpose and effect of the impugned provision’.37
Prabagaran has demonstrated that such criticisms are misplaced, for two reasons: 
they are based on a misunderstanding of the nature of secondary intention; and they 
can amount to judicial frustration of legislative policy motivated by the erroneous 
assumption that legislative intention has no role to play merely because it is unclear.
(ii) Misunderstandings of the Nature of Secondary Intention 
First, such criticisms are based on a misunderstanding of the nature of secondary inten-
tion. As the approach taken in Prabagaran shows, the search for secondary intention 
is not about what the legislature would have done upon its later learning that part of 
the legislation was unconstitutional (let us call this the legislature’s ‘hypothetical 
intention’); rather, it is about what the legislature has already, at the time of enactment, 
intended is to be done in the event that the legislation turns out to be unconstitutional. 
The former is an improper imputation to the legislature of an intention that, by defin-
ition, it never had. But the latter is perfectly permissible in principle; the real problem is 
how to ascertain the secondary intention of the legislature.
One might respond as follows. The legislature’s primary intention has been expressed 
in the normal way in which the legislature expresses its intention, viz. through legisla-
tion; there is no such expression of the legislature’s secondary intention, if indeed it 
exists; therefore, the court’s understanding of the legislature’s secondary intention is at 
best based on scanty evidence and at worst a complete fabrication.
But conversely, as Prabagaran illustrates, it is unobjectionable, and indeed quite 
proper, to refer to the legislature’s secondary intention if it has expressly made this 
intention clear, or if such secondary intention can be inferred from evidence. This 
is particularly so in Singapore, where it has been accepted that the legislature may 
34 R v. Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, ex parte Whybrow & Co (1910) 11 CLR 1 (HCA) 26–27; see also 
35.
35 Lek Gwee Noi v. Humming Flowers & Gifts Pte Ltd [2014] SGHC 64, [2014] 3 SLR 27 [179].
36 Whybrow (n 34) 27.
37 Director of Public Prosecutions v.  Hutchinson [1990] 2 AC 783 (UKHL) 811G. While Hutchinson concerned the judicial 
review of subsidiary legislation on the grounds that it was allegedly ultra vires the primary legislation authorizing its creation, 
there is no reason why the reasoning within it should not apply, mutatis mutandis, to the judicial review of primary legislation 
on grounds of unconstitutionality (save, of course, for the fact that no such judicial review of primary legislation is possible 
in English law).
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communicate its intention not only through legislation but also through speeches 
made in Parliament.38
(iii) Judicial Frustration of Legislative Policy 
Second, criticisms of a search for secondary intention are essentially centred on the 
problem of ascertaining such intention, which is a question of evidence; but they go 
on to advocate alternative approaches which abandon the search for secondary inten-
tion altogether. This may lead the court to a conclusion that totally frustrates legislative 
policy, overstepping the judicial boundaries by showing fidelity to neither secondary 
nor primary legislative intention.
To see why this is so, we will now examine the argument that the question of sever-
ability can be answered by reference only to the text of legislation and not to legislative 
intent itself. The following metaphor from Pitt v.  Holt (albeit in a different context) 
provides useful language with which to describe this sort of argument: there is a dif-
ference between a rule of a ‘monolithic character’ and a ‘bundle of benefits of different 
characters’; ‘it is obviously easier to sever part of a bundle than part of a monolith’.39
In Owners of the SS Kalibia v. Wilson (‘Kalibia’), the High Court of Australia said 
that if 
Parliament had enacted that certain specified things, say A, B, and so on down to 
Z, might lawfully be done, the first half-dozen being within its legislative power 
and the remainder outside it. There the bad can be separated from the good and 
excised, and if there be left a law not substantially or radically different, dealing 
effectively with so much of the subject matter as is within the legislative power, 
the Act will be good, minus the invalid provisions eliminated; 
but if the ‘specified things’ were described by a broad phrase such as ‘coasting trade’, 
then that phrase will be held to be ‘indivisible’ and no such excision will be possible.40
The reason for this was said to be that the latter would show legislative ‘intention to 
put [A, B… Z] on the same footing’.41 In other words, to use the metaphor from Pitt 
v. Holt,42 the court held that ‘A, B…Z’ was a severable bundle, but ‘coasting trade’ was 
an inseverable monolith. Severing a bundle was, in the court’s view, merely an act of 
‘constru[ing] the Statute so as to render it constitutional’, whereas purporting to sever 
a monolith would be ‘re-writ[ing]’ the statutory text.43
38 Reference to such speeches for the purpose of interpreting legislation, in the sense of ascertaining the ‘meaning of the provi-
sion’, is explicitly authorized by section 9A of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed). Arguably, the courts have gone 
even further and referred to such speeches even when performing tasks other than interpretation stricto sensu: see e.g. Yuen 
Wai Loon v. Public Prosecutor [2009] SGHC 160, [2009] 4 SLR(R) 176 and Tan Seet Eng v. Attorney-General [2015] SGCA 
59, [2016] 1 SLR 779, in which legislative debates were referred to not to ascertain the meaning of words, but rather to 
ascertain the scope of their applicability.
39 Pitt v. Holt [2013] UKSC 26, [2013] 2 AC 108 [23].
40 Owners of the SS Kalibia v. Wilson (1910) 11 CLR 689 (HCA) 701–702.
41 Kalibia (n 40) 699. See also Pidoto v. Victoria (1943) 68 CLR 87 (HCA) 108: ‘it would be necessary to consider whether 
such reading down would alter the policy or operation of the statute with respect to the cases which, after the reading down, 
would still remain within its terms’.
42 n 39 above.
43 Kalibia (n 40) 701–702.
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But this distinction is somewhat misleading, for the following reason: whether the 
law is a bundle or a monolith, severance will ultimately result in a change to the law, viz. 
the deletion of legislative content, which cannot be described as mere construction of a 
statute. The real question is how acceptable a change it is. Moreover, the mere fact that 
the wording of the legislation suggests that the law is a bundle is not conclusive of the 
extent to which severance will change the character of the law.
To see why this is so, consider the court’s assertion that the use of a collective noun 
such as ‘coasting trade’ would indicate an ‘intention to put [A, B…Z] on the same foot-
ing’.44 This is correct. But does it follow that the words ‘A, B…Z’ would not show such 
an intention? In truth, the words ‘A, B…Z’ could evince one of at least two possible 
legislative intentions:
[LI1] ‘that the rule apply to A, and to B… and to Z’45; or
[LI2] ‘that, in the operation of the rule, A, B…Z be treated equally/
together/for the same reasons’.
Now suppose the law is held to be unconstitutional as applied to (say) Z. It is more 
justifiable if the legislature’s intention is [LI1], and less so if it is [LI2], to sever the part 
of the law relating to Z and hold the law valid insofar as it applies to A to Y.
Consider the more concrete hypothetical example provided in Jumbunna Coal Mine 
v. Victorian Coal Miners’ Association (‘Jumbunna’), in which a legislature only has pow-
ers to ‘make laws for the government of the tropical part of South Australia’. How would 
the following two types of law stack up against this provision?
[L1] A  law ‘providing for the government of all tropical Australia as one 
whole’;
[L2] A  law ‘providing for the government of the tropical part of South 
Australia, and also…that the same provisions should apply to the tropical part 
of Queensland, and to the tropical part of Western Australia [etc.]’46
[L1] would evince legislative intention [LI2]; it would not be possible to sever the 
parts relating to South Australia from other parts. A possible justification of this is that 
the nature of task of governance changes radically and fundamentally depending on 
whether it is an entire country or only a part thereof which is being governed.
But which legislative intention does [L2] reflect: is it [LI1] or [LI2]? The answer 
depends on the legislature’s intent with regard to the words ‘that the same provisions 
should apply’:
 a. On the one hand, it could simply be drafting shorthand, as though the 
legislature was simply ‘copying’ certain provisions from under the heading 
44 Kalibia (n 40) 699.
45 This is especially strongly so when the intention is that the rule apply to as many of A, B…Z as possible: consider Jersey 
Fishermen’s Association Ltd v. States of Guernsey [2007] UKPC 30, [2008] 1 LRC 198, [57]–[60], where a law applying to 
the waters within 12 miles of Guernsey was, following excision, held valid to the extent that it applied to the waters within 3 
miles of Guernsey; the law was not struck down in toto because the legislative intent was to ‘restrict entry and fishing in the 
Bailiwick’s territorial waters’ generally.
46 Jumbunna Coal Mine v. Victorian Coal Miners’ Association (1908) 6 CLR 309 (HCA) 316.
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‘South Australia’ and ‘pasting’ them, mutatis mutandis, under the headings 
‘Queensland’ and ‘Western Australia’.
 b. On the other hand, it could evince legislative intent that it be significant 
that the laws of those three states be harmonized. In this latter case, delet-
ing [L2] altogether might well show more fidelity to legislative intent than 
deleting only the words ‘and also…that the same provisions should apply 
to the tropical part of Queensland, and to the tropical part of Western 
Australia [etc.]’.
The point is that the courts cannot abandon the search for secondary legislative 
intention and merely seek to uphold whatever legislation remains to the extent that 
it would be substantially the same law—which is the crux of the bundle-monolith dis-
tinction (i.e. that severing part of a legislative bundle does not render it substantially a 
different bundle). Rather, the question is whether what remains after severance would 
have been enacted as law at all. This is so for the following reason.
The court’s ultimate duty is one of fidelity to the Constitution. The courts must be 
concerned with upholding constitutionally compliant legislation as much as they are 
with striking down unconstitutional legislation. The former, in turn, must be upheld 
on the basis that legislation is an instance of the legislature’s constitutional power to 
express its intention into law.
Consequently, whether or not what is left after severance would be ‘substantially a 
different law’47 with a different ‘substantial purpose and effect’48 is inseparable from the 
question of what secondary legislative intent is, because whether the law is totally dif-
ferent—in other words, the salience of the differences between the law as enacted and 
the law as it is after excision—is itself a question of legislative policy for the legislature to 
decide. The content of what would be left behind following severance therefore cannot 
be the crux of the court’s inquiry; it is at most evidence—and not necessarily conclu-
sive evidence—of secondary legislative intent.
(iv) The Importance of Secondary Legislative Intent 
All this may seem rather artificial. It is not necessarily the case that the thought ever 
crossed the legislature’s mind that any legislation it makes could possibly be unconstitu-
tional. The truth is that secondary legislative intent may often be, to an extent, fictional.
But to the extent that it is a fiction, we have shown that it is an important one. It 
serves to focus our intention squarely on what the legislature intended, which it is the 
duty of the courts to put into action. In other words, even if we ask whether what would 
remain after severance would be ‘substantially a different law’, what we ought to mean 
by this is whether it would in the legislature’s view be ‘substantially a different law’. But 
this, in turn, is simply a proxy for secondary legislative intent, as we have defined it. 
Therefore, any remarks by the legislature as to what it considered to be essential features 
of the law are simply evidence from which the legislature’s secondary legislative intent 
may be inferred. Prabagaran shows us how, and on what basis, this process of inference 
may be performed.
47 Whybrow (n 34) 27.
48 Hutchinson (n 37) 811G.
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6 .  H O W  S E C O N D A R Y  L E G I S L AT I V E  I N T E N T  M AY  B E  I N F E R R E D : 
P R A B AG A R A N  A S  A  C A S E   S T U D Y
In Prabagaran, there was no direct evidence that the legislature had had a secondary 
intention in the following form: ‘If sections 33B(2)(b) and/or 33B(4) or parts thereof 
are held unconstitutional, then we wish as follows: …’ Yet the court inferred secondary 
legislative intention, both as to:
 a. the severability of section 33B as a whole; and
 b. the severability of parts of section 33B from other parts of section 33B.
Looking at the text of the legislation in vacuo merely for the purpose of wondering 
whether the law would have been rendered ‘substantially a different law’ by severance 
would, as we have seen, be purely speculative. But Prabagaran shows us that scrutinizing the 
text and structure of the legislation can still be a useful task if it is done with a view to ascer-
taining secondary legislative intention. This is especially if this task is performed in the light of 
legislative history, which is another source of evidence of secondary legislative intention.
(A) Evidence That Section 33B Was Severable from the Rest of the Act
In Prabagaran, the court held that section 33B aimed to create an exception to the policy 
laying down the mandatory death penalty; and that the exception was severable from 
the rule. In other words:
 in enacting s 33B Parliament never intended a “major sea-change” to the manda-
tory death penalty regime. The change intended was a narrow and specific one. 
If, for whatever reason, that change is unconstitutional, then that change will not 
be effective and nothing in the existing law will be affected.49
This argument was supported by the structure of the legislation. It did not have the 
following structure:
[S1] ‘ Any person who trafficks in drugs in quantities above x, and is not 
a mere transporter of the drugs who has substantively assisted the 
Central Narcotics Bureau, shall be sentenced to death’.
Rather, the Act had the following structure:
[S2]  ‘(i) Any person who trafficks in drugs in quantities above x shall be sen-
tenced to death;
(ii)  but rule (i) shall not apply to a mere transporter of drugs who has 
substantively assisted the Central Narcotics Bureau.’
It appears that in the court’s view, the difference was that [S2(ii)] was a ‘carve-out’ 
from the general rule in [S2(i)], which provided an ‘additional sentencing option’ to 
that in [S2(i)].50 In other words:
the applicants have each committed an offence which attracted the death penalty 
and that punishment would have to be imposed unless they could show that they 
satisfy the requirements provided in s 33B.51
49 Prabagaran (n 4) [32].
50 Prabagaran (n 4) [26].
51 Prabagaran (n 4) [25].
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From the ‘carve-out’ structure, the court concluded that the legislature positively 
intended the exception to stand or fall independently of the general rule. This is a lesson 
in legislative drafting: the difference between something being an exception to a rule, 
and something not even being covered by that rule in the first place is significant not 
only to issues such as the burden of proof52 but also to issues of severability in the event 
of partial unconstitutionality.
Might it be said that this was not a foregone conclusion, i.e. that there is ambi-
guity similar to that between [LI1] and [LI2] in our hypothetical examples above? 
Probably not. The reason for the confusion between [LI1] and [LI2] is that [L1] and 
[L2] had the same legal effect, viz. to provide for the governance of a number of parts of 
Australia; it was the underlying legislative policy behind the two that differed. By contrast, 
in Prabagaran, [S1] and [S2] would arguably not have had the same legal effect. [S2] 
would place the burden of proof of the elements in limb (ii) on the accused, while [S1] 
would place the burden on the state to disprove those elements.
In any event, even if the structure of the legislation was not conclusive, the court was 
fortified in its conclusion that the legislature intended section 33B to be severable for 
two other reasons:
 a. First, the Second Schedule to the Act (which prescribes the mandatory 
death penalty) existed first, and ‘[had been] in operation for an appre-
ciable period of time’; whereas section 33B (creating exceptions to the 
mandatory death penalty) was added by way of a later addition to the 
Act.53
 b. Second, the Minister moving the Bill that later became the Amendment 
Act said in the course of debates in Parliament:
…We are maintaining the mandatory death penalty for the drug offences 
where it currently applies, but are making measured and carefully defined 
exceptions to allow for the courts to impose life imprisonment instead for 
couriers in cases of abnormality of mind or where substantive cooperation 
has been provided.54
While these reasons are persuasive, neither can, in and of itself, have been conclusive:
 a. The first reason would not have distinguished between legislative intent 
to develop the law on sentencing incrementally by adding an exception to 
a rule, and legislative intent to effect an overhaul of the entire sentencing 
regime by modifying the rule and its policy basis.
 b. The second reason was a statement of the Amendment Act’s intended 
practical effect, but does not explain how it would necessarily translate into 
the conclusion of law that the rule and the exceptions were therefore sev-
erable from one another.
This is an interesting case study on how the legislature may be held to have com-
municated its secondary intention as regards the severability of legislation. More gener-
ally, the relative importance of the three types of evidence will depend not only on the 
52 See generally G Williams ‘Offences and Defences’ [1982] LS 2, 233–9.
53 Prabagaran (n 4) [30], [32].
54 Prabagaran (n 4) [26].
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particular legislation in question but also on the tools available within the legal system 
by which legislative intention is communicated generally.
(B) Evidence that Sections 33B(2)(b) and 33B(4) Were Not Severable from the Rest 
of Section 33B
An illustration of this is the fact that the legislative text did not provide any clue as to 
whether parts of section 33B were severable from the rest of section 33B. The court did 
not, however, therefore jump to the conclusion that section 33B must therefore stand 
or fall as a whole merely because, for example, it was intended to operate as a whole. 
Instead, the court appears to have proceeded on the basis that, in principle, parts of a 
legislative provision could be severed notwithstanding that they had been enacted as 
part of a whole. This is why the court’s methodology was to determine the secondary 
legislative intent as regards the particular parts of  section 33B.
The court found the answers in speeches made in Parliament, from which it con-
cluded that section 33B was
primarily intended…to disrupt the activities of drug trafficking syndicates by pro-
viding an incentive for offenders to provide information which would enhance the 
capabilities of law enforcement agencies in the war against drugs (emphasis added).55
Moreover, it appears that the court accepted that Parliament enacted section 33B on 
the basis that
‘the Public Prosecutor is better placed [than a court] to decide’ whether such 
information had been provided.56
In other words, the requirements in sections 33B(2)(b) and 33B(4) that
 a. the offender had ‘substantively assisted the Central Narcotics Bureau in 
disrupting drug trafficking activities’; and
 b. the Public Prosecutor be the one to determine whether the offender had 
rendered such assistance,
were considered by Parliament to be central to section 33B. Therefore, the severance 
of these sub-sections would result in something ‘fundamentally different from what 
Parliament intended’57—the legislature had evinced a ‘clear and express intention 
against the result of the applicants’ proposed severance’.58
This finding is of crucial theoretical importance, as it highlights two key points made 
above:
 a. The question is not whether section 33B sans those sub-sections would 
be a fundamentally different law from section 33B as it was enacted, but 
rather whether it would in the legislature’s view be a fundamentally different 
55 Prabagaran (n 4) [37].
56 Prabagaran (n 4) [52].
57 Prabagaran (n 4) [53].
58 Prabagaran (n 4) [39].
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law.59 This is why the court asked what would remain would be ‘funda-
mentally different from what Parliament intended’60 (emphasis added).
 b. The court’s task is to seek the secondary legislative intent that the legisla-
ture had had at the time of enactment, and not the hypothetical legislative 
intent that the legislature would form were it to learn after enactment that 
the legislation turned out to be unconstitutional.61 This is why the court 
emphasized that Parliament had had a ‘clear and express intention against 
the result of the applicants’ proposed severance’62 which was inferable 
from what had been said in Parliament.
For completeness, it is worth stressing that the court was engaging in a fact-finding 
exercise, involving the weighing up of various pieces of evidence which did not all point 
in the same direction. For example, the applicants referred to several other speeches 
from Members of Parliament which they claimed showed, contrary to the court’s 
conclusion, that the legislature intended to create a new ‘holistic discretionary death 
penalty framework’ rather than a ‘mere carve-out’ to the general rule that the death 
sentence be mandatory.63 It is not our intention to comment on the correctness of the 
court’s conclusion on this point. Rather, our point is simply that, because the severabil-
ity inquiry involves the search for secondary legislative intention, it engages the various 
theoretical debates as well as legal doctrines relating to the nature of legislative inten-
tion and the means by which it may be ascertained.64
7 .  W H AT,  I F  A N Y T H I N G ,  I S  TO  B E  S E V E R E D ?
There is a good reason for the approach of inquiring into the severability of parts of 
statutes and not only the whole. It is that, taking the contrary approach to its logical 
conclusion, an entire Act—even a wide-ranging one (such as Singapore’s Penal Code, 
which sets out the general part of the criminal law and defines most standard criminal 
offences)—could be struck down merely because of one objectionable provision, no 
matter how minor.65 However, proceeding on a part-by-part basis carries certain risks, 
arising from the fact that it is not true that, the more parts of legislation that are struck 
down, the better for the applicant. To the contrary, it might be better for others in the 
applicant’s position in future if the application fails than if it succeeds in part.
59 See section 5(B)(iv) above.
60 Prabagaran (n 4) [53].
61 See section 5(B)(ii) above.
62 Prabagaran (n 4) [39].
63 Prabagaran (n 4) [31].
64 For example, in Singapore, the tension is between the search for the intention of Parliament and not just individual MPs on 
the one hand (see B J Ong ‘Developments in the Law on Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation’ Singapore Law Watch 
Commentary (Issue 1/September 2013) 5; and the difficulties inherent in ‘comparing one Parliamentary statement with 
another’, especially when the statements are not ‘clear and unequivocal’ and not ‘directed to the very point in question in 
the litigation’: Attorney-General v. Ting Choon Meng [2017] SGCA 6, [2017] 1 SLR 373 [70] (see also [63]–[69]). In the 
particular context of considering Parliamentary speeches, the Singapore courts must both ‘determine whether Parliamentary 
debates are capable of giving assistance such that they should be “considered”; and if so, [] determine what weight should be 
placed on them’: Tan Cheng Bock v. Attorney-General [2017] SGCA 50 [52] (see also [50]–[53]). Note also the English com-
mon-law tradition that focuses on speeches by Ministers (or promoters of Bills) in particular: Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. 
Hart [1993] AC 593 (UKHL) 634E (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); for criticism of this provision, see Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Pepper 
v. Hart and Matters of Constitutional Principle’ (2005) 121 LQR 98, especially 104ff.
65 I am grateful to Mr Lim Sing Yong for this point.
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In the simplest type of case involving severance, there is a law in two parts, A and B. 
The applicant, seeking to avoid the effect of B, claims that B is unconstitutional. As an 
alternative, the applicant also claims that: A is to be struck down for unconstitutional-
ity; A and B are inseparable; therefore B is to be struck down too.
That case is straightforward. The more difficult case is one such as Prabagaran, in 
which the applicant wants to avoid only part of the effect of B—in other words, B is 
sub-divisible into more parts, only some of which the applicant wishes to avoid. In 
such a case, it cannot be assumed that the applicant would necessarily wish to strike 
down as much of the law as possible. To illustrate this, consider the law in question in 
Prabagaran as broken down into parts:
 [A] Anyone who trafficks drugs in quantities above x shall be sentenced to 
death66;
 [B] However, some of those traffickers referred to in [A] may be sentenced 
to life imprisonment and caning instead, provided that the conditions in 
[C], [D], and [E] are met, namely67:
 [C] The Public Prosecutor issued a Certificate to the effect that the trafficker 
substantively assisted the authorities68;
 [D] The trafficker’s acts are restricted to transporting [etc.] drugs69;
 [E] The court exercises its discretion in favour of the accused.70
Of these parts, not two, but three parts, were in contention: [A], [B], and [C]. The 
applicant had essentially three alternative arguments:
 a. [C] is unconstitutional, and [A] and [B] are inseverable from [C] (and 
[D] and [E] are meaningless in the absence of [B]). So all five parts should 
be struck down. Consequently, the sentence should be quashed.
 b. [C] is unconstitutional, so [C] should be struck down. Consequently, the 
applicants should be re-sentenced according to the principles in [A], [B], 
[D], and [E] only.
 c. [C] is unconstitutional, so [C] should be modified by removing the words 
‘The Public Prosecutor issued a Certificate to the effect that’. Consequently, 
the applicants should be re-sentenced according to the principles in [A], 
[B], [C] as modified, [D], and [E].
What the applicant would not want was for [B] (and consequently [C], [D], and 
[E]) to be struck down, but [A] left intact. That would leave a mandatory death penalty 
regime with no exceptions. It would not only not help the applicant, but harm other 
drug traffickers who would otherwise at least stand a chance to escape the death penalty.
Given this, it is worrying that the court described the applicants’ initial conten-
tion as being merely that ‘s 33B is unconstitutional’,71 which would lead to precisely 
the result just described. It is unclear whether this accurately reflects the applicants’ 
(initial) submission or whether it reflects a misunderstanding on the courts’ part. It 
does not matter, for our objective is not to assign blame—in any event, the applicants 
66 Second Schedule to the Act (n 5).
67 Section 33B(1)(a) of the Act (n 5).
68 Section 33B(2)(b) of the Act (n 5).
69 Section 33B(2)(a) of the Act (n 5).
70 Section 33B(1)(a) of the Act (n 5).
71 Prabagaran (n 4) [15].
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eventually clarified exactly what reliefs they sought—72 but to underscore the impor-
tance of an applicant making absolutely clear what he seeks to be held unconstitutional 
and severed, and what he wishes to be left intact. If the importance of this point was not 
clear from Quek and Yong, it ought to be perfectly clear now.
8 .  C O N C L U S I O N
While Prabagaran is undoubtedly presently Singapore’s leading case on the doctrine 
of severability in constitutional review, it does not purport to put forth an exhaust-
ive account of the law on severability. Moreover, it offers but one illustration of such a 
multifaceted doctrine—one wonders, for instance, how the court would have reacted 
had the evidence of secondary legislative intention been less clear (or had the permis-
sible sources of evidence of the same been different from what they are in Singapore). 
Nonetheless, we have shown that, beyond the Singapore jurisdiction, the law on sever-
ance is necessarily based on a theory of legislative intention, which in turn necessitates 
a theory of evidence of legislative intention. It is hoped that we have provided some 
food for thought on these theories by analysing a case that we hope will turn out to be 
fertile ground for future development.
9 .  A P P E N D I X :  T H E  M A N N E R  I N  W H I C H  S E V E R A N C E  I S  E F F E C T E D
Because of its conclusions on severability and the outcome of the constitutional chal-
lenges, the Singapore courts have never had to confront the issue of how severance is to 
be effected. Nonetheless, the court in Prabagaran made some potentially concerning 
remarks, on which we will now briefly comment.
(A) Textual and Substantial Severance
One might argue that implicit in the courts’ remarks (and, perhaps, counsel’s pleaded 
cases) in Quek and Yong is an assumption as to how the striking down of unconstitu-
tional legislation is to take place: namely, by deleting words. The courts did not explore 
the question of whether striking down can take place by other means, such as by modi-
fying or even adding words.
Such an assumption, had it been made, would be erroneous. Nothing in the words ‘to 
the extent of the inconsistency’ in Article 4 of the Constitution requires that the ‘extent’ 
be measured according to the individuation of provisions, clauses, or phrases in the 
statute. It is possible, for example, that a single statutory provision is unconstitutional 
to the extent that it covers certain types of case. In other words, to use the language 
of the majority of the House of Lords in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Hutchinson 
(‘Hutchinson’), though the provision might not be ‘textually severable’, it might be ‘sub-
stantially severable’.73
In such a case, according to English case law, the court’s powers are not limited to 
‘running a blue pencil through the offending part’ of the statute.74 The logic is that, 
otherwise, the court’s powers would be constrained by the rules of English grammar 
and the division of the legislation into sentences and sections, which would be ‘purely 
72 See the text accompanying n 25 above.
73 Hutchinson (n 37) 804–805.
74 This phrase, from Attwood v. Lamont [1920] 3 KB 571 (EWCA) 578, is what is meant in Hutchinson (n 37) 804D by the ‘blue 
pencil’ test.
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artificial’.75 Rather, the court can ‘modify the text in order to achieve severance’.76 As the 
court in Hutchinson impliedly emphasized, this is not the same as modifying the law.77 
Rather, it is an act of modifying the text in order to keep the law ‘unchanged in its legis-
lative purpose, operation, and effect’,78 but changed only in scope.79
For example, if (hypothetically) the Caning Restriction Provision (with which Yong 
was concerned)80 were found to be unconstitutionally discriminatory on grounds of 
gender, such discrimination could be remedied by adding the words ‘who are more 
than 50 years of age at the time of infliction of the caning’ after ‘women’.
(B) Did Prabagaran Reject the Possibility of Substantial Severance?
It is unclear what the status of substantial severance is after Prabagaran. However, the 
court appears to have made certain remarks to the effect that substantial severance 
would not be possible in Singapore.
To see why, it is necessary to examine the applicants’ pleaded case in more detail. Of 
the various alternative forms of relief they sought,81 one called for an ‘amend[ment]’ of 
section 33B, ‘such that it is the court, and not the [Public Prosecutor], that determines if 
an offender has substantively assisted the Central Narcotics Bureau in disrupting drug 
trafficking activities’.82 This attempt at ‘amend[ment]’ was premised on Article 162 of 
the Constitution, which provides that certain laws can be
construed…with such modifications, adaptions, qualifications and exceptions as 
may be necessary to bring them into conformity with this Constitution.
The applicants further submitted that Article 162 was a ‘guide’ to the operation 
of Article 4, and guided the way to the use of the ‘well-known techniques of sever-
ance, reading in, reading down and striking out’ which were part of a process known 
as ‘remedial interpretation’.83 As authority for the availability of such techniques of 
‘remedial interpretation’, the applicants cited a Hong Kong case, HKSAR v. Lam Kwong 
Wai (‘Lam’).84
In response, the court made the following remarks on the courts’ powers under 
Article 4:
 a. The court remarked that Lam was inapplicable, as Hong Kong’s Basic Law 
had no equivalent of Singapore’s Article 4 and Article 162. The court said 
that ‘there is no need for the implication of remedial powers’ into Article 
162 or Article 4—this suggests that Article 4 and Article 162 themselves, 
on their own terms, exhaustively set out the courts’ powers when faced 
with unconstitutional legislation.
75 Commonwealth v. Hitchings (1855) 5 Gray 482 (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts) 486, referred to in Jumbunna (n 
43) 318.
76 Hutchinson (n 37) 811G.
77 Hutchinson (n 37) 804C.
78 Hutchinson (n 37) 804G.
79 Hutchinson (n 37) 811F.
80 See section 3(B) above.
81 See text accompanying n 25 above.
82 Prabagaran (n 4) [40].
83 Prabagaran (n 4) [49], citing HKSAR v. Lam Kwong Wai (2006) 9 HKCFAR 574 [71]–[73].
84 Lam (n 84).
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 b. The court also remarked that ‘modificatio[n], adaptatio[n], qualificatio[n] 
and exceptio[n]’ mentioned in Article 162 are only exercisable under 
Article 162 and not Article 4:
the purport of Art 162 is not really that different from Art 4 in respect of the 
laws to which they apply, but only in respect of the manner in which they 
apply. Article 162 allows the court to construe all laws in conformity with the 
Constitution while Art 4 provides the power to void such laws…85
 c. The court held that Article 162 of the Constitution does not apply to 
section 33B as it applies only to laws which existed or ‘had already been 
enacted but not yet brought into force at the commencement of the 
Constitution’.86 In other words, if at all the applicants were to succeed, it 
would be pursuant to Article 4 and not Article 162.
 d. Finally, the court described the power available under Article 4 as a ‘power 
to void’ unconstitutional laws,87 subject to the ‘doctrine of severability’.88
The effect of these remarks might be that the act of ‘void[ing]’ unconstitutional laws 
and the ‘doctrine of severability’ do not include the acts of ‘modificatio[n], adaptatio[n], 
qualificatio[n] and exceptio[n]’ or ‘reading in [and] reading down’ legislation. This 
would suggest that the only power under Article 4 consists of the deletion of words 
from a statute.
It is unclear whether the court intended to express this conclusion, which would be 
questionable. As we have seen, the court accepted that Article 4 of the Constitution 
allows for the ‘doctrine of severability’.89 We have also seen that the doctrine of sev-
erability must include not only textual severability but also substantial severability—
which does allow for the modification of the words of a statute. There are limits to what 
severance can do (for example the court cannot end up playing the role of legislator), 
but these limits do not foreclose the notion of substantial severability in principle. It is 
hoped that the Singapore courts will have occasion to clarify this point in future.
85 Prabagaran (n 4) [44].
86 Prabagaran (n 4) [41].
87 Prabagaran (n 4) [44].
88 Prabagaran (n 4) [41].
89 Prabagaran (n 4) [41].
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